

On the non-uniformity of pronouns: 1st sg, 2nd sg, and impersonal pronouns

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1 Introduction

- In the traditional semantic literature on personal pronouns, there is a strong focus on 3rd person singular pronouns, and their anaphoric behavior.
- 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns are discussed predominantly in the context of deixis and indexicality, and recently in the connection with attitude reports and shifted indexicals.
- Both of these areas of investigation are concerned with personal pronouns as referential expressions, i.e. as expressions that denote single individuals.
- **Aims of this talk:**
 - Highlight the connection between 1st/2nd person singular pronouns with impersonal pronouns: impersonally interpreted 1st/2nd persons singular pronouns.
 - Discuss their potential importance for various lines of investigation concerning pronominal expressions.

2 The distinction of 1st/2nd vs. 3rd person singular

- Singular personal pronouns do not constitute a single, uniform class: 1st and 2nd person pronouns differ from 3rd person pronouns in the following respects:
 - (i) Referential 1st and 2nd person pronouns refer “automatically” to an individual in the utterance context (cf. Kaplan 1978[1989]); 3rd person singular pronouns do not refer automatically in this sense, but in contrast are freer with respect to their possible referents.
 - (1) a. A to B: **I** like sushi. \rightsquigarrow A likes sushi.
 - b. A to B: **You** like sushi. \rightsquigarrow B likes sushi.
 - c. A to B: **He/she** likes sushi.
 \rightsquigarrow X (whoever A intends to refer to) likes sushi.
- \Rightarrow for 3rd person pronouns the speaker can freely choose his referent from the context—
as long as it can be made clear, e.g. by a deictic gesture, who the speaker refers to
 \Rightarrow 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns are “pure indexicals”¹

¹Benveniste (1971[1956]) uses the term “indicators” for 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns. The term “pure indexical” is Kaplan’s (1978[1989]), who distinguishes them from “demonstratives” that need a disambiguating ostension, e.g. deictic 3rd person singular pronouns.

- (ii) Anaphorically used 3rd person pronouns are *pro-forms*, i.e. they can “stand in” and pick up the referents of non-quantificational full DPs; 1st and 2nd person pronouns cannot be employed in this way (cf. Benveniste 1971[1956]).

- (2) a. **Peter** likes **his** mother. [his = Peter]
 b. **Peter** likes **my/your** mother. [my/your ≠ Peter]
 (3) a. **Peter** likes sushi. **He** also likes sake. [he = Peter]
 b. **Peter** likes sushi. **I/you** also like sake. [I/you ≠ Peter]

- (iii) Anaphorically used 3rd person pronouns can be bound by quantificational antecedents. In some rare cases exemplified below, bound readings of 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns also occur (cf. Rullmann 2004, Heim 2005, Kratzer 2009).

- (4) a. I’m the only one around here who can take care of **my** children.
 (Kratzer 2009:188)
 b. *entailment under bound reading*: no one else can take care of their children
 (5) a. Only **you_F** eat what **you** cook. (Kratzer 2009:188)
 b. *entailment under bound reading*: no one else eats what they cook

⇒ the subscript *F* indicates focus

- (iv) 3rd person singular pronouns have uses as donkey pronouns in which they co-vary with an indefinite DP. 1st and 2nd person donkey pronouns do not seem to exist in this sense. Consider (6).

- (6) a. If **a speaker** says a sentence, **I** usually mean it.
 b. Every speaker who offends **an addressee** will apologize to **you** later.

- The following (cross-linguistically stable) picture arises:

	pure indexical	pro-form	deictic	co-referential	bound	donkey
1st	yes	no		yes	yes (restricted)	no
2nd	yes	no		yes	yes (restricted)	no
3rd	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Table 1: Differences between 1st and 2nd vs. 3rd person singular

- This does not look too promising *if the goal is to analyze/argue for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person pronouns as a semantically uniform class*. In fact, Benveniste 1971[1956] regards the difference between 1st/2nd and 3rd person pronouns as a categorical difference:

“In the formal class of pronouns, those said to be of the ‘third person’ are, by their function and by their nature, completely different from *I* and *you*.”
 (Benveniste 1971[1956]:221)

- Traditionally, 3rd person singular pronouns are treated like variables except for donkey pronouns (and related uses) which are treated analyzed as definite descriptions (cf. e.g. Kamp & Reyle 1993, Heim & Kratzer 1998, Buring 2005, 2011).
- 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns are traditionally given a strict context-dependent semantics in the sense of Kaplan (1978[1989]). To assimilate the semantics of 1st and 2nd

person singular pronouns to the view of pronouns as variables has been argued to make undesirable predictions (Kratzer 2009).

- Recently, it has been proposed to treat all uses of 3rd person singular pronouns uniformly as definite descriptions (cf. eg. Elbourne 2005, 2013, Sauerland 2007a).

Question: Can 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns given an analysis as definite descriptions? Can/should they be treated as such?

⇒ Kaplan (1978[1989]) strongly argues against analyzing *I* as “the speaker of this utterance”:

(7) *If no one were to utter this sentence, I would not exist.*

Are there analyses of 1st and 2nd person singular as definite descriptions that would not run into this type of problem?

3 Enter: impersonal pronouns

- In the discussion on the semantics of 3rd person singular pronouns, dedicated impersonal pronouns, like English *one* and German *man*, are usually excluded.

- (8) a. **One** does not use a sword to kill a snail.
b. **Man** verwendet kein Schwert um eine Schnecke zu töten.
one uses.3SG no sword in-order a snail to kill

- Given the strong focus on the anaphoricity of 3rd person singular pronouns, they are excluded for good reason:

- Dedicated impersonal pronouns cannot be bound by quantificational DPs.

(9) *Every boy likes **one**’s mother.*

- 3rd person singular pronouns cannot be anaphoric to dedicated impersonal pronouns (cf. Cabredo-Hofherr 2004, 2008).²

(10) *If **one** wants to feel comfortable there, **one/he** has to clean **one**’s/**his** flat.*

- With respect to their sentential contexts, dedicated impersonal pronouns are also restricted.
 - English *one* is restricted to generic sentences.³ In episodic sentences, *one* can only be read either as the numeral or the common noun.⁴

²An exception to this generalization are combinations of existential *man* and corporate *sie* (Engl. ‘they’) in episodic sentences.

(i) **Man** hat mir gestern mein Rad gestohlen. **Sie** haben nicht mal das Schloss dagelassen.
one has me yesterday my bike stolen they have not even the lock left-behind
‘Yesterday, someone stole my bike. They didn’t even leave behind the lock.’

³This is supported by the fact that sentences containing *one* express generalizations that show the typical characteristics of generic sentences: they allow for (legitimate) exceptions and they support inferences to appropriate counterfactuals (cf. Drewery 1998).

⁴On the three different homophonous lexical items spelled *one* see Payne et al. (2013).

- (11) a. **One** does not use a sword to kill a snail. (generic)
 b. Yesterday, **one** stole my bike. (episodic)

– German *man* can occur in generic and episodic sentences although with different interpretations: in generic sentences, *man* is interpreted like *one*; in episodic sentences, it is interpreted similarly to *jemand* (Engl. ‘someone’)

- (12) a. **Man** verwendet kein Schwert um eine Schnecke zu töten. (generic)
 one uses.3SG no sword in-order a snail to kill
 ‘One does not use a sword to kill a snail.’ (= impersonal use)
 b. **Man** hat mir gestern mein Fahrrad gestohlen. (episodic)
 one has me yesterday my bike stolen
 ‘Yesterday, someone stole my bike.’ (= existential use)

- Neither English *one* nor German *man* have a genuine “referential use”.
- Condoravdi (1989), Moltmann (2006, 2010, 2012), Malamud (2006, 2012) and others propose to model *one* and *man* in generic sentences as contributing individual variables that are bound by the generic operator *Gen* (cf. Krifka et al. 1995, Mari et al. 2013).

(13) $Gen [x;] [does-not-use-a-sword-to-kill-a-snail(x)]$

⇒ Analyzed in parallel to: *Normally, a person does not use a sword to kill a snail.*

- Note that *one* and *man* are not kind-denoting: they do not support kind-predications.

- (14) a. *Dodos are extinct.*
 b. *The dodo is extinct.*
- (15) a. **As a dodo, one is extinct.*
 b. **Als Dodo ist man ausgestorben.*
 as dodo is one extinct

- The interpretation of the existential use of *man* is analyzed as existential closure of the variable contributed by *man* if either no generic operator is present (in an episodic sentence) or *man* is not interpreted in the restrictor of *Gen*.

(16) *Weil man der Universität eine größere Summe gespendet hat, können Studenten nun Anträge auf Erlass der Verwaltungsgebühren stellen.*
 because one the university a larger sum donated has can
 students now applications on waiver of-the administration-fees file
 ‘Since someone donated a larger sum of money to the university, students can now file an application for a waiver of their administration fees.’

(17) *Man hat gestern im Radio Studenten als “faules Pack” beschimpft.*
 one has yesterday in-the radio students as lazy vermin insulted
 ‘Yesterday, someone called students “lazy vermin” on the radio.’⁵

⇒ German *man* shows parallels with bare plurals. In the literature on genericity, bare plurals are still standardly treated as Heimian indefinites (cf. Heim 1982[1988]) that contribute a free variable plus restrictive descriptive content.

⁵I feel insecure about this sentence. I believe that this is a statement about students in general although one might also readily agree that this is an episodic sentence. This weird mix might be one of the complexities of what happens if the expression that contributes the variable for *Gen* to bind is in non-subject position (cf. Krifka et al. 1995).

4 The connection between 1st and 2nd person singular and impersonal pronouns

- In many languages, 2nd person (singular) pronouns also have an impersonal use (cf. e.g. Kitagawa & Lehrer 1990, Alonso-Ovalle 2002, Egerland 2003, Malamud 2006, Gruber 2011, Zobel 2014).⁶

(18) *In those days, **you** could marry **your** cousin.* (Malamud 2006:84)

(19) ***Du** kannst als Frau doch auch Ansprüche haben, denen nicht jeder Mann
you can as woman PRT also standards have that not every man
gerecht wird.
suitable becomes
'As a woman you can also have standards that not every man meets.'*
(Zobel 2014:15)

(20) *Credo che in questo lavoro [**pro**] **ti** faccia male spesso.* (Italian)
I-believe that in this work pro yourself make bad often
'I think that you hurt yourself often doing this job.'
(Gruber 2011:351)

(21) *En ese departamento [**pro**] trabajas como un esclavo.* (Spanish)
in that department pro work.2SG like a slave
'In that department you work like a slave.'
(Alonso-Ovalle 2002:2)

- German 1st person singular *ich* also allows for this use (cf. Zobel 2010, 2014).

(22) ***Ich** kann doch als Brautpaar nicht von **meinen** Gästen erwarten, dass sie
I can PRT as bridal-couple not from my guests expect that they
mir quasi die Feier finanzieren!
me more-or-less the party finance
'A bridal couple can't expect their guests to more or less pay for the party!'*
(Zobel 2014:17)

- **Important note:** Morphosyntactically, the impersonal uses and the referential uses of 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns behave identically, i.e. are indistinguishable. All examples of impersonal uses are in principle ambiguous.
- **Central observation:** the semantic contribution of impersonally used personal pronouns and impersonal pronouns in generic sentences is truth-conditionally equivalent (cf. Kitagawa & Lehrer 1990, Zobel 2014).

(23) a. *Wenn **ich** als Mannschaft gewinnen will, muss **ich** kämpfen.*
if I as team win want must I fight
'If a team wants to win, it has to fight.'
b. *Wenn **du** als Mannschaft gewinnen willst, musst **du** kämpfen.*
if you as team win want must you fight
'If a team wants to win, it has to fight.'
c. *Wenn **man** als Mannschaft gewinnen will, muss **man** kämpfen.*
if one as team win want must one fight
'If a team wants to win, it has to fight.'
(Zobel 2014:22)

⁶Further languages that allow for impersonal uses of 2nd person singular pronouns are listed in Siwierska (2004) and Gruber (2013).

⇒ **Support:** different impersonally used pronouns may be substituted for each other

- (24) *Es gibt eigentlich keine bestimmten Tricks die man als Anfänger lernen*
it exists not-really no specific tricks that one as beginner learn
muss. Du kannst als Anfänger z.B. auch Shadow lernen.
must you can as beginner e.g. also Shadow learn
‘There are no specific tricks that a beginner has to learn. As a beginner, you can
e.g. also learn Shadow.’⁷ (Zobel 2014:23)

- **Consequence:** The contribution of impersonally used 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns and dedicated impersonal pronouns to the truth-conditions of a sentence is the same.

Interim summary:

1. 1st and 2nd person pronouns in their referential uses are analyzed as directly referential individual-denoting expressions, i.e. as definite expressions.
2. The impersonal use of 1st and 2nd person pronouns parallels the use of impersonal pronouns in generic sentences.
3. Impersonal pronouns behave like bare plurals, i.e. indefinite expressions.

Question 1: The referential use and the impersonal use seem to require substantially different analyses; should a unified account for both uses be attempted nevertheless? Can such an account be given?

⇒ Two attempts at unified accounts for English 2nd person and German 1st and 2nd person singular can be found in Malamud (2006, 2012) and Zobel (2014:Ch2), respectively.

Question 2: If the referential use and the impersonal use are not the result of an under-specified lexical entry, how are the two uses connected?

5 The pragmatic effects of impersonally used pronouns

- **Observation:** different impersonally used pronouns can be used to contrast different groups of people for which a generalization is made.

Context: Songtext of German Rapper Massiv, *Alles oder Nichts* (‘All or nothing’):
“I’m fed up to hear that I’m not from Berlin ...”

- (25) *Denn als Nichtberliner macht man dir das Leben schwer*
because as person-not-from-berlin makes one you the life heavy
‘Because one gives you a hard time if you’re not from Berlin.’⁸

⇒ *man* ≈ (a subset of) people from Berlin

⇒ *dir* = people that are not from Berlin (given explicitly by the *als*-phrase)

- Apart from their form, impersonally used pronouns also differ in their pragmatic effects. These effects also set them apart from indefinite singular noun phrases and bare plurals in “ordinary” generic sentences: they are **speaker-oriented**.

⁷The topic of this example are pen-spinning tricks.

⁸I thank Patrick Grosz for this example.

Scenario: An exhibition of Klimt paintings in Vienna, including *Judith and the Head of Holofernes*.

- (26) a. **Visitors** can see the painting from the entrance.
b. As a visitor, **one** can see the painting from the entrance.
- (27) a. **Besucher** können das Bild vom Eingang aus sehen.
visitors can the painting from-the entrance PRT see
b. **Ich** kann als Besucher das Bild vom Eingang aus sehen.
I can as visitor the painting from-the entrance PRT see
c. **Du** kannst als Besucher das Bild vom Eingang aus sehen.
you can as visitor the painting from-the entrance PRT see
d. **Man** kann als Besucher das Bild vom Eingang aus sehen.
one can as visitor the painting from-the entrance PRT see

⇒ For (26-b) and (27-b)–(27-d), the speaker intuitively conveys a personal point of view with respect to the generalization as specified above.

- Moltmann (2006) and Zifonun (2000) (independently) describe the speaker-orientation for *one* and *man*, respectively, as given below.

“[...] intuitively, with generic *one* a speaker draws a generalisation by applying the predicate to any (human) being as if that human being was himself [...]”

[a statement with *one* can express] “a generalisation of the speaker’s own, perhaps one-time experience, where the speaker can assume that this experience is generalizable.”

[in another use a generalisation containing *one*] “is presented with the intention to be at least potentially applied in a first-person way by the speaker or, more likely, the addressee, or both.”

(Moltmann 2006:258–273)

“Especially significant on the pragmatic level is the use of *man* for which generalizability is intended. In this use, it is communicated:

- a. that the generalisation that applies to all (relevant) individuals is also applicable to the speaker and
- b. what the speaker experiences could be experienced in the same way by all other (relevant) individuals, as well.”

(translated from Zifonun 2000:242)

- In Zobel (2014), I propose to capture this speaker-orientation with the following additionally conveyed at-issue content.

- (28) **Speaker-oriented content:** If the speaker has the relevant property for the generalization to apply to him (e.g. given by an *as/als*-phrase), he believes that it applies to him, and if he does not have the relevant property for the generalization to apply to him, he believes that it would apply to him if he had that property.

⇒ **Prediction:** (27-b)–(27-d) cannot be uttered in all contexts. If a person knows for a fact that in principle he or she is unable to see the painting for whatever reason, he or she cannot utter these sentences.

- Zobel (2014) adopts the formal treatment for generic sentences of the form ‘*Fs are G*’ / ‘*an F is G*’ proposed in Drewery (1998).⁹

- (29) a. $\forall w[w \sim_{F,G} w \rightarrow \forall x[F(x)(w) \ \& \ N_{F,G}(w)(x, w) \rightarrow G(x)(w)]]$
 b. For all generically accessible worlds, it is the case that all relevantly normal *Fs* with respect to being *G* are *G*.

- With this formalization, the speaker-oriented content can be given the following formal rendering:

- (30) a. **Not-at-issue content contributed by *man*:**
 $\lambda w. [F(c_S)(w) \rightarrow \text{Believe}_w(c_S, \lambda w. N_{F,G}(w)(c_S, w))] \ \& \$
 $[\neg F(c_S)(w) \rightarrow \text{Believe}_w(c_S, \lambda w. \forall w \in \text{MaxSim}_{F(c_S),w}[N_{F,G}(w)(c_S, w)])]$
 b. The speaker believes that he is a non-exceptional *F* with respect to being *G* if he is an *F*, or that he would be a non-exceptional *F* with respect to being *G* if he were an *F*.

- The speaker-oriented component conveys “unpluggable”¹⁰ not-at-issue content. Further projection tests point towards expressive CI content in the sense of Potts (2005) (cf. also Amaral et al. 2007, Roberts 2011). But the make-up of the proposed content is also compatible with Schlenker’s (2007) *self-fulfilling presuppositions*.

- Impersonally used 1st and 2nd person singular differ from impersonal pronouns and from each other by showing different additional participant-oriented effects.

- **1st person singular:** signals distance between the speaker and others (but not necessarily other discourse participants); communicates that the speaker has grounds to believe that the regularity expressed by his utterance, which he fully supports, may not be supported, or adhered to by others.

Scenario: Forum discussion “How much money does one give as a present at a wedding?” - The initial question is whether 100 euros is enough. One user argues that it is customary to adjust the amount of money to the size and cost of the wedding party held by the bridal couple. Another user takes issue with this claim:

- (31) *Ich kann doch als Brautpaar nicht von meinen Gästen erwarten, dass*
 I can PRT as bridal-couple not from my guests expect that
sie mir quasi die Feier finanzieren!
 they me more-or-less the party finance
 ‘A bridal couple can’t expect their guests to more or less pay for the party!’
 (Zobel 2012:13)

- **2nd person singular:** aims to create closeness between the speaker and the addressee; invites the addressee to check whether her experiences fit with the generalization (or simulate the needed experiences, cf. Moltmann 2006, 2010), and to come to the same conclusion as the speaker.

⁹If no *als*-phrase or other modifying material is present to specify the relevant *F*-property, I assume that *F* is set to the property of being an animated individual. Note, though, that the lexical material that is present inside the generic sentence, as well as the linguistic context, may suggest that a more specific property has to be understood.

¹⁰This term was taken from Sauerland (2007b).

⇒ Malamud (2006): “Empathy tracking effects”; the addressee’s empathy is directed towards the group of people

- (32) a. **One** could have thrown **you** in jail for that. (empathy with object)
b. **You** could have thrown **one** in jail for that. (empathy with subject)

- **Crucially:** referentially used 1st and 2nd person singular are completely neutral in this respect, i.e. they do not have any comparable pragmatic effects.

Problems with investigating impersonal 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns:

- 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns are very frequent in their referential uses, but very infrequent in their impersonal uses.
- The impersonal uses belong to spoken language. In written form they occur rather frequently in forum discussions and comments to newspaper articles. They are rare in “standard texts” that can be found in corpora.
- Even if enough impersonal uses can be found in corpora, the uses are not tagged as such.

Question: How could a more principled investigation of these uses be conducted?

6 Impersonal pronouns under attitudes

- **Preliminary considerations:** When investigating impersonal pronouns in attitude reports, at least the following two factors need to be controlled for.
 - **The choice of expression used in the attitude holder slot:**
 - (i) referential expressions (e.g. proper names)
 - (ii) quantificational expressions (e.g. universally quantified DPs)
 - (iii) “generic NPs” and the respective impersonal pronoun
 - ⇒ different expressions might lead to different interpretational possibilities
 - **The choice of attitude verb:** different attitude verbs might allow for different connections between the attitude holder and the impersonal pronoun.

In addition, the behavior of the individual variable contributed at the at-issue level and the behavior of the speaker-oriented content need to be considered separately.

- Previous investigations on the behaviour of the **individual variable** at the at-issue level:¹¹
 - Inspired by Moltmann (2006), Malamud (2006, 2012) investigates *one* embedded under attitudes. She looks at sentences of the following kind (details are given in the Appendix):

- (33) **One** always remembers **one**’s giving a speech. (Malamud 2012:31)

⇒ **Claim:** *one* is necessarily *de se* at the at-issue level

¹¹Note that neither Malamud (2006, 2012) nor Kratzer (1997) distinguish two levels of contribution. In an account that distinguishes the two levels, their discussions would fall on the at-issue level, though.

- Kratzer (1997) observes that German *man* can be interpreted *de se* in attitude reports.¹²

- (34) *Man erklärte mir, man habe seine Brille vergessen.*
one explained me one had one’s glasses forgotten
‘Someone/an unspecified person explained to me that he had forgotten his glasses.’
(with modifications from Kratzer 1997:8)

- Previous investigations on the behaviour of the **speaker-oriented content**:

Moltmann (2010, 2012) discusses occurrences of *one* under certain attitude predicates as supporting evidence for the *first-person-connection* of *one*: the speaker-orientation that is observable in unembedded cases is shifted towards the reported attitude holder.

- (35) a. *John thinks that one can see the picture from the entrance.*
(Moltmann 2010:443)
b. *John found out that one can see the picture from the entrance.*
(Moltmann 2012:169)

⇒ Moltmann’s account of *one* (as it is presented) predicts that the speaker-oriented content is always shifted to the attitude holder (see Appendix for formal details): a sentence containing *one* is a property that has to be self-ascribed by an attitude holder.

- What is missing is a systematic investigation along the lines suggested in the preliminary considerations since...

...the occurrences of *one* in (35) are not *de se* wrt. the variable at the at-issue content.

- (36) *John thinks that one can see the picture from the entrance.*
≠ *John thinks that he_{de-se} can see the picture from the entrance.*

⇒ the *de se* construal seems to be restricted to cases where the attitude holder is also *one/man*

...the speaker-oriented content is not obligatorily shifted to the attitude holder: there are embedded speaker-oriented cases and cases in which it is unclear for whom the speaker intends to attribute the not-at-issue content to.

- 1) **Constructed speaker-oriented examples:**

Scenario: Paul and Mary plan to visit the Klimt exhibition. Peter read/heard various things about the exhibition, and when he learns that Paul wants to go with Mary, he tells Paul what he knows.

- (37) Peter: *Soweit ich weiß, können Besucher der Ausstellung den ‘Kuss’*
as-far-as I know can visitors of-the exhibition the Kiss
schon vom Eingang aus sehen.
already from-the entrance PRT see
‘As far as I know, visitors can see the Kiss already from the entrance.’

¹²Kratzer translates *man* in episodic sentences with *they*. I do not think that this is a good translation. Even though *they* can have an impersonal-like reading (cf. Kitagawa & Lehrer 1990), this reading is closer to its standard referential use than to what *man* is doing in these cases: *man* seems to express something like *jemand*. Sometimes the context provides enough information to restrict the possible candidates for who this person is; in the remaining cases the identity of that person is simply not relevant.

Paul: *Peter hat gesagt, dass **man** den ‘Kuss’ schon vom Eingang aus
Peter has said that one the Kiss already from-the entrance PRT
sehen kann.
see can
‘Peter said that one can see the Kiss already from the entrance.’*

Scenario: Peter and Paul discuss a reform of the laws dealing with petty crimes. Unbeknownst to Paul, Peter and Mary commit petty crimes. Peter reports Paul’s opinions to Mary.

- (38) Peter: *Ich hoffe, dass Kleinkriminelle härter bestraft werden.
I hope that petty-criminals harder punished will-be
‘I hope that petty criminals will be punished harder.’*
Paul: *Peter hofft, dass **man** als Kleinkrimineller härter bestraft wird.
Peter hopes that one as petty-criminal harder punished will-be
‘Peter hopes that as a petty criminal one will be punished harder.’*

– 2) Attested ambiguous example:

Context: Review of the Rev. William Barrow (1802) “An Essay on Education; in which are particularly considered the merits and the defects of the discipline and instruction in our Academics”. The style in which the reviewer writes about the text strongly suggests that he shares the author’s opinion.

- (39) *Er behauptet, dass **man** Sprachen nicht ohne die Grammatik gründlich
he claims that one languages not without the grammar thoroughly
erlernen könne, und dass das Kind gewisse Dinge auswendig lernen und es
learn can and that the child certain things by-heart learn and it
sich sauer werden lassen müsse.
himself sour become let must
‘He claims that one cannot learn languages thoroughly without grammar, and
that a child has to learn certain things by heart and has to put in a lot of
effort.’¹³*

⇒ the use of *man* cannot be unambiguously attributed to either the reviewer (=speaker) or the author (=attitude holder); the author may have used *one*.

- The speaker-orientation of *one/man* seems to mirror the behavior of expressives as reported in Harris & Potts (2009): the context and other available information influence the choice of speaker vs. attitude holder.
- **Question:** What is the behavior of impersonally used 1st and 2nd person in these contexts?
⇒ A detailed investigation is still needed.
⇒ A first observation: the *de se* construal at the at-issue level is observable for impersonal *ich*, as well.

¹³Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung Nr. 193, Wednesday July 6, 1803, columns 41–42

Context: Forum discussion on “Do love and respect belong together?” – The first user argues that love does not necessarily require respect for the partner. The second user answers that the first user obviously does not know what respect means and continues with the following.

- (40) ***Ich** kann doch nicht sagen, dass **ich** meine große Liebe nicht respektiere! Das*
I can PRT not say that I my great love not respect this
passt doch hinten und vorne nicht zusammen!
fits PRT behind and in-front not together
‘One can’t say that one doesn’t respect one’s one true love! This just doesn’t hold
water!’¹⁴

⇒ intuitively, this is very different from cases of either logophoric pronouns or shifted indexicals!

Question:

¹⁴<http://www.talkteria.de/forum/topic-110638-10.html>

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Appendix

The treatment of *one* in Moltmann (2006, 2010, 2012)

- Moltmann argues that sentences containing *one* express *first-person-based genericity*.
- **Proposal:** the contribution of *one* are *qua*-individual variables, i.e. *qua*-individuals for which the slot of the individual being qualified is filled by an individual variable.

- (41) a. **Contribution of *one*:** $qua(x, \lambda y.\text{identifies-with}(y)(z))$
 b. ‘the individual x as someone z identifies with’

⇒ The free variable z stands for the relevant *first person*, i.e. in root clauses, the speaker when the sentence is uttered, the addressee when he interprets the sentence, and in attitude reports, the attitude holder.

- Moltmann adopts the definition of *qua*-individuals given in Fine (1982), with an additional restriction in condition c (which is intended to capture the first-person-connection).

- (42) *Qua*-predication forms a new type of individual, x qua P . The three defining properties of *qua*-individuals formed in this way are
- a. x qua P exists in a world w whenever $P(x)(w)$
 - b. x qua $P = x'$ qua P' iff $x = x'$ and $P = P'$
 - c. x qua P has a property Q in w iff $Q(x)(w)$ whenever $P(x)(w)$, and the *qua*-property P provides epistemic grounds for x being Q .
- (cf. Moltmann 2010:206)

⇒ The contribution of *one* is an individual variable that ranges over individuals x that the first person z identifies with.

- The full analysis of a sentence containing *one* is as follows:

- (43) $\lambda z.\text{Gen } x[\text{can-see-the-picture-from-the-entrance}(qua(x, \lambda y.\text{identifies-with}(y)(z)))]$

- Given the definition of *qua*-individual above (specifically the last clause), this formula is interpreted as follows:

- (44) Ex. (43) is true iff (i) in all generically accessible worlds w' those people that the first person identifies with in w' can see the picture from the entrance in w' , and (ii) the speaker’s identification with these individuals provides the epistemic grounds for the speaker’s claim that these individuals can see the picture from the entrance.

- This paraphrase highlights the main problem I see for this account: the *qua*-predication directly restricts the domain of the generic operator. This means:

- (i) For each individual, a sentence with *one* expresses a generalisation about a potentially different set of people.
- (ii) Unless a given individual identifies with all relevantly normal individuals, a sentence with *one* and its corresponding ordinary generic sentence are never true in the same situations.

- **Caveat:** Moltmann (2012) explicitly states that the *identifies-with* relation is not supposed to restrict the domain of *Gen*, but may “influence the domain of quantification”; the domain “will consist of entities the speaker identifies with” (Moltmann 2012:174). The only way I can make sense of this is that *qua*-predication is supposed to convey in some other manner than restriction that the speaker identifies with the individuals in this fixed domain. As far as I understand Moltmann’s formalization, Fine’s proposal for *qua*-predication, and the behavior of *as*-phrases, though, this intuition is not captured (cf. Zobel 2014).

Malamud’s (2012) investigation on the *de se* behavior of *one*

- Malamud reports the results of a survey for the following scenario:

(45) *One* and reference *de re*:

- a. A psychologist conducts massive experiments in which people are filmed giving speeches, then given a forgetting pill, and then are shown the films of themselves and others speaking. A year later they are asked to recall the films they were shown. By the time the subjects had to recall the films, it turned out that many people forgot they ever gave a speech. However, everyone had very good recollections of the films, and everyone remembered films of their own performances. People recalled the films but didn’t realise they were actually recalling their own speech-giving.
- b. *One always remembers giving a speech.* (false)
- c. *One always remembers one’s giving a speech.* (false)

⇒ the experiment in the scenario falsifies the sentence in (45-b); expected since the content of the complement of *remember* contains PRO which is obligatorily *de se* ⇒ most of the informants who judged (45-c), also judged it to be false in the scenario.

- **Malamud’s conclusion:** American English *one* cannot be interpreted *de re*.
- In a footnote, Malamud adds that some speakers did not “have a 1st-person connection”. For these informants, *one* could be *de re* for the scenario in (45).